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Symposium
The Interpretation/Construction Distinction in
Constitutional Law: Annual Meeting of the
AALS Section on Constitutional Law
INTRODUCTION
Amy Barrett*
One of the most interesting developments in the
constitutional theory of new originalism is its exploration of the
distinction between interpretation and construction in
constitutional law. Within this framework, “interpretation”
refers to the process of determining a text’s linguistic meaning,
and “construction” refers to the process of giving the text legal
1
effect. The distinction plays out in the new originalist approach
to the Constitution as follows. The defining characteristic of new
originalism is its argument that the original public meaning of
2
the Constitution’s text should control its interpretation. Yet new
originalists do not contend that the Constitution’s original public
3
meaning is capable of resolving every constitutional question.
The Constitution’s provisions are written at varying levels of
generality. When the original public meaning of the text
establishes a broad principle rather than a specific legal rule,

* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010).
2. The “old originalism,” by contrast, treated the original intentions of the
Constitution’s drafters as the gauge of the Constitution’s meaning. For accounts of new
originalism, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV.
611 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW.
U.L. REV. 923 (2009); Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
599 (2004).
3. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 645 (“Due to either ambiguity or generality, the
original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique rule of law to be applied
to a particular case or controversy.”).
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interpretation alone cannot settle a dispute. In that event, the
5
need for construction arises. The First Amendment is a classic
example. As Larry Solum observes, that amendment “provides
for ‘freedom of speech’ and forbids its ‘abridgement,’ but this
does not create a bright line rule, and as a consequence most of
the interesting work in free speech doctrine must be done by
6
construction rather than interpretation.” Many, though not all,
new originalists accept constitutional construction as a means of
7
dealing with constitutional ambiguity and vagueness.
4. Old originalists often relied heavily upon the framer’s expected applications to
resolve questions occasioned by ambiguity or vagueness. See Whittington, supra note 2,
at 603 (describing the beliefs of old originalists in this regard). New originalists largely
reject that approach. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 2, at 622–23 (distinguishing between
“semantic” originalism and “expectations” originalism (citing Ronald Dworkin,
Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (Amy Gutman ed., 1997)); Whittington, supra note 2, at 610–11 (asserting
that the founders’ expectations about how a constitutional provision would be applied do
not control the determination of that provision’s meaning, for the “founders could be
wrong about the application and operation of the principles that they intended to
adopt”). But see John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive
Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–82 (2007)
(contending that original expected applications can play an important role in the
determination of the Constitution’s original public meaning).
5. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999) (“Regardless of the extent
of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution, there will remain an
impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered. The judiciary may be
able to delimit textual meaning, hedging in the possibilities, but after all judgments have
been rendered specifying discoverable meaning, major indeterminacies may remain. The
specification of a single governing meaning from these possibilities requires an act of
creativity beyond interpretation . . . . This additional step is the construction of
meaning.”). Solum contends that insofar as a text’s linguistic and legal meaning
conceptually differ and construction involves giving a text legal effect, construction
technically occurs even when a text is precise. Solum, supra note 1, at 102 n.18 and
accompanying text. Nonetheless, Solum concedes that “[c]onstruction . . . grabs our
attention in cases in which the linguistic meaning of a text is vague.”). id. at 106.
6. Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to
Professor Griffin (June 19, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract=1130665).
7. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have been the most vocal dissenters to
what they describe as “constructionist originalism.” See John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case
against Construction, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 751, 752 (2009). Whether courts—as opposed to
political actors—can legitimately engage in constitutional construction is a distinct
question, but also a point of disagreement among originalists. Some—for example, Jack
Balkin, Randy Barnett and Larry Solum—see constitutional construction as central to
judicial review. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution,
103 NW. U.L. REV. 549 (2009); RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION (2003); Solum, supra note 2. Others see constitutional construction as
primarily the province of the political branches. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to
Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006) (implicitly
rejecting judicial construction, at least in any strong form, by arguing that judges should
defer to the political branches when the Constitution’s meaning is “indeterminate (or
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The new originalist move toward the interpretationconstruction distinction has opened space for agreement
between originalists and nonoriginalists. The old originalism was
not known for an emphasis upon the role of factors such as
values, purposes and precedent in the exercise of judicial
8
review. But insofar as constructing constitutional doctrine
requires consideration of factors other than the text, it invites
reliance upon some of the interpretive modalities that
originalism had traditionally been understood to de-emphasize
9
10
or even exclude. The existence of this “construction zone” has
prompted some self-proclaimed “living constitutionalists” to
defect to originalism on the rationale that the two theories are
11
not, in fact, polar opposites.
Originalism’s embrace of this two-function model of
constitutional decisionmaking also opens potential common
ground for originalists and those nonoriginalists who employ a
similar model. At roughly the same time that some new
originalists began to focus on the interpretation-construction
12
distinction, some leading nonoriginalist scholars, spurred by
under-determinate) as to the specific question at hand”); KEITH WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
15 & 16 n.43 (1999) (not denying some role for the judiciary in constructing the
Constitution, but emphasizing the primary role of the political branches in undertaking
what he describes as an essentially political activity).
8. See Whittingon, supra note 2, at 600–03 (describing the concern of early
originalists about decisions made according to subjective value choices and their related
resistance to Warren Court precedent).
9. Philip Bobbit identifies six “modalities” of constitutional argumentation:
historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential. See PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–22 (1991). New originalists do not deny the
relevance of these modalities even at the point of determining the Constitution’s original
public meaning. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 611 n.59 (“Certainly originalists would
be willing to draw inferences based on the constitutional structure, for example, or
employ arguments based on precedent, though such arguments would ultimately be
harnessed to some claim about the original meaning of the Constitution.”). Yet insofar as
the text recedes in importance at the stage of construction, those modalities other than
original meaning of the text, which are the ones that nonoriginalists tend to emphasize,
play a larger role. Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 6 (asserting that in the process of
constitutional construction, “[s]omething external to the text—whether political
principle, social interest, or partisan consideration—must be alloyed with it in order for
the text to have a determinate and controlling meaning within a given governing
context.”).
10. This phrase belongs to Larry Solum. Solum, supra note 6, at 6.
11. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 7, at 551 (arguing that “original meaning originalism
and living constitutionalism are not only not at odds, but are actually flip sides of the
same coin.”); Barnett, supra note 2, at 617–20 (discussing how the new originalism
accommodates the values of political progressives).
12. Keith Whittington is credited with launching discussion of the
interpretation/construction distinction in the new originalist literature. See
WHITTINGTON, supra note 5; WHITTINGTON, supra note 7.
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Richard Fallon’s Foreword in the 1997 Harvard Law Review,
began writing about the distinction between interpretation and
implementation in constitutional law. Fallon pointed out that
while we talk about the Court engaging in “constitutional
interpretation,” much constitutional doctrine does not even
purport to interpret the Constitution’s “meaning.” He argued
that the Court’s practice in this regard is reflective of the fact
that, “[i]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution is not the
Court’s only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to
implement the Constitution successfully. In service of this
mission, the Court often must craft doctrine that is driven by the
Constitution, but does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning
14
Others, including Mitch Berman and Kim
precisely.”
Roosevelt, have followed Fallon’s focus on the Court’s dual
functions of interpretation and implementation to offer rich
15
accounts of how we should understand what the Court does.
Not everyone in the nonoriginalist camp has accepted this “two
16
output thesis” about judicial review; notably, both Rick Hills
13. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon,
Supreme Court]; See also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION
(2001) [hereinafter FALLON, IMPLEMENTING]. Of course, even before the more recent
discussions about constitutional construction and constitutional implementation, scholars
had pointed out that constitutional doctrine does not always mirror—or even pretend to
mirror—what the document itself requires. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3
(1975) (distinguishing between judicial decisions actually interpreting the demands of the
Constitution and the rules of “constitutional common law” that “draw[] their inspiration
and authority from, but [are] not required by, various constitutional provisions.”);
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978) (asserting that judicial doctrines often stop
short of enforcing constitutional norms to their full conceptual limits, and thus cannot be
said to represent the “meaning” of those norms). This earlier work laid the foundation
for contemporary theories.
14. Fallon, Supreme Court, supra note 13, at 57. Professor Fallon identifies the
“rational basis” test under the Equal Protection Clause, the “actual malice” standard
under the First Amendment, and the four-part test for evaluating First Amendment
protection for commercial advertising as examples of implementing doctrine. FALLON,
IMPLEMENTING, supra note 13 at 5.
15. Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2004)
[hereinafter Berman, Rules] (distinguishing between “constitutional meanings” and
“constitutional rules.”); Kermit Roosevelt, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655–58 (2005) (describing the
“decision rules” model of constitutional law). See also Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules: Thoughts on the Carving
of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39, 41 n.3 [hereinafter Berman,
Constitutional Constructions] (collecting citations to other scholars who have employed
the interpretation/implementation model).
16. The term “two output thesis” belongs to Mitch Berman. See Mitchell Berman,
Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 202, 220–21 (2006)
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17

and Daryl Levinson have rejected it. Thus, the interpretationconstruction distinction gives new originalists something in
common with many nonoriginalists that even the latter’s fellow
18
travelers do not share.
The papers in this issue, which are the product of a panel
hosted by the Constitutional Law Section at this year’s annual
meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, explore
the implications of the interpretation-construction distinction for
debates about constitutional theory. They reveal that despite the
above-described points of convergence between originalism and
its rivals, debates about originalism are alive and well. In
particular, the interpretation-construction distinction does not
eliminate long-running disputes about originalism’s approach to
interpretation. The new originalist commitment to original
public meaning privileges semantic meaning over other factors
19
and historical over modern understanding. As such, this
approach sometimes yields different results in hard cases than
nonoriginalist approaches, even those that subscribe to the twooutput thesis. It will sometimes exclude interpretations that a
nonoriginalist would prefer, and because originalists treat a
text’s fixed semantic meaning as defining the permissible bounds
20
of construction, it will sometimes also rule out implementing

(defining the “two output thesis” as “the claim ‘that there exists a conceptual distinction
between two sorts of judicial work product each of which is integral to the functioning of
constitutional adjudication,’ namely judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and judgecrafted tests bearing an instrumental relationship to that meaning”). See also Berman,
Rules, supra note 15, at 41 (emphasizing that constitutional operative propositions are
‘logically and perhaps normatively prior to” constitutional decision rules).
17. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional
Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 173, 175 (2006)
(objecting to the interpretation/implementation construct because “pragmatically
speaking, the meaning of a constitutional provision is its implementation”); Daryl
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858
(1999) (challenging a “rights essentialism” that attempts to separate a “pure
constitutional value” from its “remedial apparatus”).
18. For example, despite their many differences, Mitch Berman and Larry Solum
both insist that a two-output model of constitutional decisionmaking is conceptually
valuable. See Berman, Constitutional Constructions, supra note 15, at 60–68 (asserting,
contrary to skeptics like Hills and Levinson, that the two-output thesis is conceptually
valuable); Solum, supra note 6, at 42 (“[C]ollapsing this distinction [between
interpretation and construction] can create practical confusion that is every bit as
pernicious as the theoretical confusion that infects arguments over originalism.”).
19. That is not to say that originalists exclude the possibility that other factors, such
as precedent, may occasionally trump the original public meaning. See, e.g., Solum, supra
note 2, at 938–39.
20. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 647 (asserting that the original public meaning of a
text, even when ambiguous or vague, “still provides a ‘frame’” that excludes some
possibilities and permits others).
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doctrines that taxonomists like Fallon and Berman would
embrace. The interpretation-construction distinction may have
broadened the range of factors that originalists will consider in
constitutional decisionmaking, giving them something in
common with nonoriginalists, and the two-output thesis may
have given them something in common with those
nonoriginalists who identify themselves as taxonomists. But the
foundational originalist commitment to fixed linguistic meaning
remains a significant difference between originalism and
competing theories of constitutional interpretation.
The articles that follow reflect this disagreement in a lively
debate about the nature of interpretation and its role in the twooutput thesis. Assuming that one accepts the two-output thesis,
what should occur at the first stage of constitutional analysis, the
one that both originalists and taxonomist nonoriginalists devote
21
to “interpretation”? Is the original semantic meaning of
constitutional text entitled to significantly more weight than
22
other interpretive considerations? Does the interpretationconstruction distinction have value for those who reject the
23
originalist approach to interpretation? If the process of
interpretation is capacious enough to include considerations
other than the text’s semantic meaning, is it meaningful to
separate the development of constitutional law into two steps, or
should all constitutional decisionmaking be conceptually
24
collapsed into the single step of “interpretation”?
21. Compare Solum, supra note 1, at 95–96, 100–02 (describing the “interpretation”
phase of the two-step framework as devoted to the determination of linguistic meaning)
with Berman,Constitutional Constructions, supra note 15, at 45–46, 60–61 (describing the
first, “interpretation” phase of the two-step framework as devoted to the determination
of legal, not simply linguistic, meaning). See also Berman, Constitutional Constructions,
supra note 15, at 59 (contending that it is “misleading or distracting to assign a particular
label—and the label ‘interpretation’ at that!—to what is only one among the several
arguments or considerations that, in appropriate cases, contribute to the Constitution’s
legal meaning.”).
22. See Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic
Evolution of Federalist 10, at 9, 13–15, 36 (arguing that original semantic meaning is just
one consideration among the many that determine constitutional meaning); Berman,
Constitutional Constructions, supra note 15, at 58–60 (denying that “fixed linguistic
meaning” has “uniquely privileged status.”).
23. Berman denies the utility of the originalist approach to the two-output thesis
while defending the Fallon/Berman/Roosevelt variant of the two-step approach against
pragmatist challenges. See Berman, Constitutional Constructions, supra note 15, at 60–68.
Solum argues that separating linguistic from legal effect is conceptually important even
for those who take a nonoriginalist approach to the determination of linguistic meaning.
Solum, supra note 1, at 96, 105–18.
24. Berman resists a collapse of the interpretation-construction distinction as he
defines it on the ground that “even if law is determined in ways favored by most theorists
who lean ‘pragmatic’ or ‘nonoriginalist,’ it is nonetheless of pragmatic value to recognize
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Because it is the privilege of an Introduction to raise
questions without answering them, I will conclude by identifying
some of the questions about the interpretation/construction
distinction that this symposium provokes for future discussion.
Perhaps because originalists focus on the document and
25
nonoriginalists on the doctrine, originalist work on the twooutput thesis has tended to focus heavily on the question of
interpretation, while nonoriginalists working with the thesis have
more closely considered the factors that inform the
26
But
implementation stage of constitutional decisionmaking.
what of judicial construction for the originalist? A key feature of
nonoriginalist work on implementation is the acceptance of
doctrines that overenforce the Constitution’s operative
27
provisions. Does the originalist approach to construction permit
28
29
judicial overenforcement? Underenforcement? Even apart
that courts build conceptually separate norms, tests, frameworks—in a word, doctrine—
to implement pragmatically determined law.” Berman, Constitutional Constructions,
supra note 15, at 63. Solum resists a collapse of the interpretation-construction as he
explains it on the ground that whatever “interpretation” is defined to include, a
conceptual difference between the determination of semantic and legal meaning remains.
Solum, supra note 1, at 110, 115–16.
25. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 26–27 (2000) (distinguishing between “documentarians,” who emphasize “the
amended Constitution’s specific words and word patterns, the historical experiences that
birthed and rebirthed the texts, and the conceptual schemas and structures organizing the
document,” and “doctrinalists,” who focus less on the text, history, and structure and
more on “synthesiz[ing] what the Supreme Court has said and done, sometimes rather
loosely, in the name of the Constitution”).
26. Jack Balkin, who places far more emphasis on construction than interpretation,
is an exception. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 7, at 569–83. I am also focusing here on
judicial construction. Keith Whittington has offered a rich account of the process of
political construction of the Constitution. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 7.
27. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 15, at 18-50; FALLON, IMPLEMENTING, supra note
13, at 6; Roosevelt, supra note 15, at 1669–72.
28. Originalists insist that constitutional constructions must be consistent with the
provisions they enforce. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 2, at 647. But because an
overenforcing doctrine supplements rather than contradicts the relevant constitutional
provision, an overenforcing doctrine is not necessarily inconsistent with the provision.
Moreover, there may be room for overenforcement in originalist theory even if
overenforcing doctrines of judicial review are illegitimate. See Amy Coney Barrett,
Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 168–77 (2010) (describing
Justice Scalia’s rejection of overenforcing doctrines of judicial review, but opining that
even originalists may accept some overenforcement of the Constitution through the use
of constitutionally based substantive canons of construction).
29. Nonoriginalist scholars have given serious attention to the doctrines of judicial
review that underenforce the Constitution’s operative propositions. See Fallon, Supreme
Court, supra note 13, at 64–67; Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Judicially Manageable Standards
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006); Kermit Roosevelt,
Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 193 (supporting judicial
underenforcement
but
expressing
serious
reservations
about
nonjudicial
underenforcement). See also Sager, supra note 13.
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from the problem of under and overenforcement, what factors
30
should drive the development of implementing doctrines? Is
any deference due the political branches on matters of
31
construction, and if so, how much?
It is unrealistic to expect originalists to provide a uniform
answer to any of these questions. But as the papers in this
symposium illustrate, debate about the interpretation/
construction distinction brings new perspectives to age-old
disputes about judicial review. Whether you ultimately agree or
disagree with the theory, it is one worth reading about.

30. Originalists have offered some thoughts, but it is a topic on which they disagree
and on which there is room to say more. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 7, at 773
n. 79 (noting disagreement among new originalists about the factors that should guide the
process of constitutional construction).
31. As stated above, some originalists conceive of construction as an essentially
political activity. See supra note 7. But even those originalists who understand
construction as also a judicial function must decide whether the political branches are
due some measure of deference with respect to their constitutional constructions, as
opposed to their constitutional interpretations. Jack Balkin has had the most to say about
the interaction of political and judicial constructions. See Balkin, supra note 7 at 559–85

